

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	NND 949022
By	MN NARA Date 2/1/05

No. 507

ORS. 507

By Auth. A. C. of S., G-2
 Date 9 Aug 45

WAR DEPARTMENT
 Office of A. C. of S., G-2

Total pages--13
 (Incl. TAB A)

"MAGIC"—FAR EAST SUMMARY

Declassified Per Chapter 3,
 DoD Regulation 5200.1R (Nov 73)

JSB

25 April 77

1. Hiroshima--Japanese Reports on Atomic Bomb Attack:
 - a. At 2155I on 7 Aug the 12th Flying Div (Hq Ozaki, 80 m. SW of Hiroshima) sent to the Air General Army at Tokyo the following report, entitled "Eyewitness Account (and Estimates Heard) of the Sixth Air Army and and of this Division, in regard to the Bombing of Hiroshima (#2 Report)":

"(1) Report on the bomb used (an estimate) and resulting conditions: A violent, large, special-type bomb, giving the appearance of

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... was dropped over the center of the city of Hiroshima this morning by a formation of three or four planes (it is also said that there was only one plane; some say that the bomb was attached to a parachute). It is estimated that, after being dropped from a plane, the bomb exploded at a certain altitude above the ground (500 to 1,000 meters). There was a blinding flash and a violent blast. (Over the center of the city the flash and the blast were almost simultaneous, but in the vicinity of the airfield* the blast came two or three seconds later.) Then a mass of white smoke billowed up into the air.

(2) The flash was instantaneous, burning objects in the immediate vicinity, burning the exposed parts of people's bodies as far as three kilometers away, and setting fire to their thin clothing.

(3) The blast leveled completely or partially as many as 60,000 houses within a radius of three kilometers, and smashed glass blocks, etc.

*The main airfield is just south of the city.

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"(4) Losses: The majority of the houses within the city were completely or partially leveled. The conflagration spread all over, and many important areas were destroyed by fire. The majority of government buildings were either leveled or destroyed by fire. Many people were injured by burns from the flash and by objects shattered by the blast, particularly by glass fragments, and, as far as was observed, [word missing] one-third of the residents were either seriously or slightly injured.

"(5) Countermeasures:

"(a) Personnel, aircraft, etc., have been moved underground. (Partially underground [word missing] walls, if they are strong, are all right.)

"(b) We must keep a strict watch even for a small number of planes.

"(c) Planes must be dispersed and their tanks emptied.

"(d) The height of the planes should be lowered (even if it be only the height of the wheels) and the ailerons fixed in place. Walls of valleys should be used to protect planes on the ground."

b. Available parts of a later report from the

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12th Flying Div, sent out at 1000I on the 8th, include the following:

(1) "Because conflagration broke out suddenly and the spread of the fire was rapid, we think that 70 or 80 per cent of the people in the city were casualties."

(2) "As a result of the horrible catastrophes brought about by the recent air raid, there appears to be a gradual increase in the circulation of wild and fantastic rumors. Moreover, there have been an increasing number of cases in which the fighting spirit of victims or eyewitnesses has been broken. However, in this prefecture* the mobile police officials are doing everything in their power to [words missing] the spread of such frenzied rumors, and are using every means at their disposal to provide against this in advance. In order to calm the people's fears, they are particularly stressing the fact that, even in the recent air raid, those who took refuge immediately in the safe underground shelters escaped injury completely."

g. A Japanese Navy report, transmitted from Kure at 1124I on the 8th but apparently prepared somewhat earlier, includes the following statements:

*Apparently a reference to Yamaguchi prefecture (where the message originated), which lies to the west of Hiroshima prefecture.

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(1) "The concussion was beyond imagination, demolishing practically every house in the city."

(2) "Present estimate of damage: About 80 per cent of the city was wiped out (destroyed or burned). Only a portion of the western section escaped the disaster. Casualties have been estimated at 100,000 persons."

(3) "Relief squads have been dispatched to the area to assist the Army in rescue operations. About 1,000 Army troops and 10,000 [word missing] medical supplies were moved in by dawn on the 7th."

2. Honshu--Build-up in Thirteenth Area Army Sector:

SEE PULL-OUT MAP ATTACHED TO PAGE 6

On the basis of the movement of one division to the Thirteenth Area Army sector (Central Honshu) and the identification of another there, MIS has raised its strength estimate for the sector by 40,000--to 240,000:

(1) The 224th Div is believed to have moved to the sector, probably from the Hiroshima area. A 4 Aug message assigns the Division to the area shown on the map, with the 143rd Div adjacent to it on the west.

(2) The 209th Div has been identified in the Kanazawa area from a 26 July message. The Division

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probably was formed in the Kanazawa Divisional District.

The 209th and 224th bring the total of active divisions carried in the Thirteenth Area Army sector to five. With the increase in combat forces in the sector, the Japanese apparently have set up an Army Hq (the Fifty-fourth) at Shinshiro, southeast of Nagoya.

Note: Identification of the 209th brings the total of active divisions identified in the Japanese Army to 145 (including 4 armored); of those, 43 (including 1 armored) are in Japan proper.

5. Planned Japanese Troop Movements out of Burma:

A 4 Aug message from the Burma Area Army (Hq Moulmein), gives the following schedule for the withdrawal of troops from Burma during August and September:


August	Troops	7,800
	Patients*	4,000
September	Troops	15,000
	Patients	4,000
	Total	<u>30,800</u>

The message states that some of the 15,000 troops scheduled to move in September will be shipped in August "if the situation permits", and that "in order to carry out the operation quickly the Army would like to transport some

*Word not certain.

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THIRTEENTH AREA ARMY SECTOR	
ESTIMATED DISPOSITIONS	
9 Aug 45	
ESTIMATED STRENGTH:	
Army Ground	150,000
Navy Ground	10,000
Air Ground	10,000
TOTAL:	270,000



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of the men packed as tightly as possible." The destination of the troops is not given.

Note: MIS estimates present Japanese strength in Burma at 54,000.

4. Engine Difficulties with Zeke Fighters:

An 15 June message, just available, from Air Flotilla 72 (Kyushu interception command) discloses that serious difficulties with the single-engine fighter Zeke (still the most widely used Navy fighter) were being caused by frequent engine breakdowns. The message made the following statements about the Sakae engine, which is the standard engine used in Zeks:

(1) Almost all the Sakae engines of the Zekes in the Flotilla had broken down, and had to be replaced after less than 30 hours' use. During May, one unit which had 40 Zekes found it necessary to replace 40 engines (after an average life of about 20 hours). Under such conditions, "it cannot be hoped to increase operational strength."

(2) "Instead of improving conditions", the countermeasures taken against defective parts had actually brought about an increase in breakdowns. Proper inspection "is definitely lacking at the

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

10 August 1945.

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief of Staff.

The next bomb of the implosion type had been scheduled to be ready for delivery on the target on the first good weather after 24 August 1945. We have gained 4 days in manufacture and expect to ship from New Mexico on 12 or 13 August the final components. Providing there are no unforeseen difficulties in manufacture, in transportation to the theatre or after arrival in the theatre, the bomb should be ready for delivery on the first suitable weather after 17 or 18 August.

L. R. Groves

L. R. GROVES,
Major General, USA.

8/10/45

not sent?

It is not to be released in Japan without express authority from the President.



~~TOP SECRET~~

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

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THIRTEENTH AREA ARMY SECTOR ESTIMATED DISPOSITIONS 9 Aug 45	
<u>ESTIMATED STRENGTH:</u>	
Army Ground	190,000
Navy Ground	10,000
Air Ground	10,000
TOTAL:	210,000



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